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Abstract—Automatic patch generation can significantly reduce
the window of exposure after a vulnerability is disclosed. Towards
this goal, a long-standing problem has been that of patch
localization: to find a program point at which a patch can be
synthesized. We present PATCHLOC, one of the first systems which
automatically identifies such a location in a vulnerable binary,
given just one exploit, with high accuracy. PATCHLOC does not
make any assumptions about the availability of source code, test
suites, or specialized knowledge of the vulnerability. PATCHLOC
pinpoints valid patch locations in large real-world applications
with high accuracy for about 88% of 43 CVEs we study. These
results stem from a novel approach to automatically synthesizing
a test-suite which enables probabilistically ranking and effectively
differentiating between candidate program patch locations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security vulnerabilities can remain unpatched for months
after their initial disclosure [29], [28]. This has motivated
recent interest in automatic patch generation techniques for se-
curity vulnerabilities [14], and more broadly, general program
repair techniques have independently advanced as well [21].
These techniques recommend deployable patches, which can
be inspected and finalized by the developer, reducing the time
window of exposure to exploits.
The problem of automatic patching can be decomposed into
two: patch localization and patch synthesis. Patch localization
aims to identify particular locations in the program at which
one can patch the program. Patch synthesis aims to generate a
fix (or program statements) modifying the program variables
at the identified locations to eliminate the vulnerability. It has
been shown that once a suitable location is identified, synthesis
is feasible through a number of prior techniques [21], [6]. In
this paper, we focus on the patch localization problem, which
has remained an elusive practical goal.
User experience studies highlight that developers expect
an automated patch localization tool to be fairly accurate.
Developers are willing to inspect a handful (typically 5) patch
locations recommended by localization tools [20]. However,
prior techniques yield recommendations with such accuracy in
less than 50% of the programs studied and most techniques
do not scale to large applications [20]. Furthermore, these
techniques make many assumptions, such as the availability
of program source code, a plethora of auxiliary code metrics
beyond just source code [22], or extensive test-suites [18].
In this work, we tackle patch localization for vulnerabilities
in real-world programs. We make localizing fixes possible
with minimal assumptions. We assume that the only available
information is a single executable exploit, such as those
typically available in CVE reports, and the program itself. Our
technique works with program binaries and does not assume
access to source code. Our techniques are agnostic to the
type of vulnerability being patched—we only assume that an
observable outcome (e.g. a crash) can characterize exploiting
runs. Our techniques do not assume access to an external test-
suite. Lastly, our technique is based on runtime instrumentation
and observing recorded program states; we carefully avoid
using any sophisticated program analyses which may not scale
on binaries. While the suggested locations are eventually given
to a human developer, we believe that working with minimal
assumptions makes our technique more deployable in any stage
of the development pipeline. One can also view our proposed
technique as the first part of a larger system that automatically
synthesizes full patches at the binary level, though we only
focus on the localization step in this work.
Our general approach is based on statistical fault local-
ization [33]. Program locations can be assigned a probability
estimate or score, which measures how likely is the program
going to be exploited if the instructions corresponding to those
locations are executed. High scores suggest that it is both
sufficient and necessary for these instructions to be executed
in order to reach the vulnerability and exploit it. Patching at
these locations is likely to eliminate the vulnerability while
minimizing the impact on benign program behaviors—we
explain why this is so in Section II-B.
Though statistical fault localization has been proposed
about two decades ago, it has not produced high-fidelity results
so far. One question has remained unresolved in prior works:
under which input distributions should these probabilistic
scores be estimated? This issue is of fundamental importance
to statistical localization because the probabilistic quantities
of interest can not be robustly estimated under arbitrary input
distributions. Test inputs not designed with the objective of
patch localization will often lead to over-fitting. The estimated
scores will either be biased by failing (exploit) tests or benign
ones, depending on which of these dominate the provided test-
suite. Ad-hoc or poorly chosen test-suites fail to distinguish
between candidate program locations, essentially assigning
them the same score. The problem is acute in large applications
in which more than a thousand locations may be observed
in single program execution. To avoid over-fitting, the key
problem reduces to synthesizing a specific kind of test-suite
which we refer to as concentrated. A concentrated test-suite
exercises a sufficient diversity and quantity of program paths in
the neighborhood the exploit path. The probabilistic quantities
of interest can be estimated robustly using such a test-suite.
We propose a simple procedure to construct a concentrated
test-suite from a single exploit. The procedure is a new form
of directed fuzzing, which we call as concentrated fuzzing or
CONCFUZZ. Directed fuzzing techniques have witnessed rapid
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advances recently, however, their prime application has been
for crash reproduction and patch testing [8]. Our work is the
first, to the best of our knowledge, to propose its application
for patch localization. CONCFUZZ is unlike other forms of
directed fuzzing, which primarily aim to reach a particular
location. The goal of CONCFUZZ is to estimate the probability
of each branch being executed in exploiting and benign runs.
It generates inputs that exercise paths in the neighborhood
of the path taken under the given exploit to estimate these
probabilities. CONCFUZZ is simple to implement. It requires
instrumentation of a small number of program points. We im-
plement our proposed techniques in a tool called PATCHLOC.
Our main empirical finding is that our new approach
scales to large applications and has high accuracy in finding
patch locations. We evaluate PATCHLOC on 43 CVEs on
programs ranging from 10K - 2M LOC. We use a single exploit
available from the CVE report and the program binary for each
benchmark. In about 88% of these benchmarks, PATCHLOC
pinpoints at least one location in its Top-5 ranked outputs,
where a patch equivalent to the developer-generated patch
exists. Our techniques can be used to localize from crashes,
exploits, or any other oracle of failure—our tested CVEs cover
many common types of security vulnerabilities. The locations
highlighted by PATCHLOC can be passed to a patch synthesis
tool; in our evaluation, we manually synthesize the patch to
confirm that the vulnerability can be patched at the highlighted
locations.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
1) We present PATCHLOC, a patch localization tool
with very few assumptions. It takes a vulnerable
application binary and an exploiting test case as input
and outputs Top-5 candidate locations.
2) PATCHLOC is the first work to propose directed
fuzzing for localization. We propose a novel di-
rected fuzzing technique called concentrated fuzzing
(CONCFUZZ), which explores benign and exploiting
paths in sufficient diversity around the given exploit
path. We demonstrate that the test-suites generated
using CONCFUZZ are able to avoid over-fitting to
specific test types and allow distinguishing effectively
between different candidate locations.
3) We evaluate the efficacy of PATCHLOC on 43 CVEs
in large real-world applications. PATCHLOC localizes
patches for about 88% of the CVEs within Top-5
locations in around 4 hours per CVE.
II. MOTIVATION & PROBLEM
Automated patching consists of two steps: patch localiza-
tion and patch synthesis. If accurate patch locations can be
recovered, existing program synthesis tools can be used to
generate vulnerability patches [21]. We focus on the patch
localization problem in this work.
A. Problem
To keep the assumptions minimal, we only assume access
to a vulnerable application binary Prog, an exploit input ie and
the corresponding security specification. The specification is
1 static int PixarLogDecode(TIFF* tif){
2 ...
3 + /* Check that we will not fill more than what was
allocated */
4 + if (sp->stream.avail_out > sp->tbuf_size){
5 + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "sp->
stream.avail_out > sp->tbuf_size");
6 + return (0);}
7 // write into sp->stream
8 int state = inflate(&sp->stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
9 }
10 // Function that cleans up pixarlog state
11 static int PixarLogCleanup(TIFF* tif){
12 ...
13 _TIFFfree(ptr);
14 }
Fig. 1: Developer provided patch for CVE-2016-5314, Patch
is not at the crash location.
violated while executing Prog with ie. Given the specification,
we implement a vulnerability oracle to detect whether Prog
gets exploited under a specific test-case. A program crash
can be an oracle for memory safety. For numerical errors
(e.g., divide-by-zero), the processor provides hardware bits that
can be checked. No source-level information is necessary to
implement the oracle.
For the rest of the paper, we use the notion of observed
branch locations. Concretely, when we execute the program
binary with an input, we observe only the branch locations
executed. Based on which branches are observed in the
execution of specific inputs (generated via fuzzing), certain
branches are predicted as patch locations by our technique.
The localization is performed at the basic block level, since we
want PATCHLOC to work even when the source code or debug
symbols are unavailable. We say the prediction is correct, if the
basic blocks immediately preceding/succeeding the predicted
branch can be modified (or are modified in the developer-
generated patch) to fix the vulnerability. Note that the final
patch, whether manually written or automatically generated,
can be applied anywhere inside the predicted basic blocks.
For security vulnerabilities, one could assume that applying
a patch right before the crash location is sufficient [14]. This is
not a valid assumption, and in fact, developer-provided patches
often do not follow such a pattern (see our Section VI). The
task of identifying a correct patch location is more subtle.
There are two objectives for a correct patch: 1) stopping the
failing (or exploiting) program runs, and 2) preserving com-
patibility with benign runs. Consider a bug in the open-source
library, LibTIFF [23], shown in Figure 1. It is a heap overflow
vulnerability involving the buffer sp->stream. It arises from
out-of-bound writes in PixarLogDecode function at Line 8
without checking the buffer length, which causes the head of
the next heap to be filled with arbitrary data. The crash occurs
when the invalid pointer is freed in another utility function
called _TIFFfree. Since it is a utility function which is used
by other functions (such as PixarLogCleanup), it is not
known whether the pointer to be freed is invalid or not at the
crash location. Moreover, any changes to the utility function
_TIFFfree would change other benign behaviours of the
program. Instead, a better way to patch this program is to
prevent the out-of-bounds write since the buffer size is known
during the write—as done in the developer provided patch.
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Notice that it requires domain-specific knowledge to infer the
correct patch location and the complexity of this inference will
vary with each bug.
B. A Statistical Framework
Consider the execution of Prog under ie. Let the set
of program branches encountered in the execution before
violating the security specification be V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn}
and the execution trace be U = 〈u1, u2, · · · , um〉. Each ui ∈ U
is an instance of a branch L(ui) where L(ui) ∈ V . Now,
consider the execution of Prog under a wide variety of inputs
I , possibly generated by fuzzing with the exploiting input as
the seed. Under each input, we see a subsequence of U in
the execution trace with a subset of V observed. Each vi and
uj are associated with a Bernoulli random variable Xi and
Yj respectively. Each random variable takes a value 1 if it is
observed in that execution trace, else 0. Similarly, the violation
of the security specification can be captured by a Bernoulli
random variable C, which is 1 if the program violates the
security specification, and 0 otherwise.
This abstraction allows us to reason about the statistical
correlation between the events where C and X take on certain
values. If an event Xi=1 happens in all of the exploit traces in
the input set I , one could induce that (C=1)⇒ (Xi=1), which
indicates that patching at vi might avoid all exploits seen. How-
ever, it is possible that the patch might significantly change the
benign behavior of the program. Conversely, consider an event
such that whenever it occurs the program gets exploited. One
can then induce that (Xi=1)⇒ (C=1). Since this event is not
observed on any benign test, patching at vi is likely to have
the least impact on benign behaviors, with the caveat though
that such a patch may not cover all exploits seen. The best
patch should prevent all exploits while having the least impact
on benign runs. Overall, an event which is both necessary and
sufficient carries a strong signal of the root cause underlying
the exploit and is an ideal patch location candidate.
Consider the branch vi such that the instances of vi appear
as Ui = {uj |L(uj) = vi}. As a result, we can compute the
probability of each branch location being witnessed as the
probability that at least one of its instances is witnessed:
P (Xi = 1) = P (
⋃
uj∈Ui
Yj = 1)
We now compute two scores for each branch location vi:
• Necessity score is P (Xi = 1|C = 1), the likelihood
of observing at least one instance of the branch on an
exploiting input;
• Sufficiency score is P (C = 1|Xi = 1), the likelihood
of getting exploited on an input where at least one
instance of the branch is observed.
Similar to the scores for each branch location, we can
also define necessity and sufficiency scores of a single branch
instance uj which are P (Yj = 1|C = 1) and P (C =
1|Yj = 1) respectively. Branches with the highest K necessity
and sufficiency scores are highlighted to the developer. The
developer can then synthesize a fix in or around these locations.
C. Our Approach
The framework presented thus far is similar to the un-
derpinning of a long line of works on statistical fault isola-
tion [33], [18]. However, there is a central issue left unad-
dressed, which we study here: under which input distribution
should the probabilities be estimated?
Consider computing the necessity score for each instance
P (Yj = 1|C = 1). As the probability of observing uj deep
down in the execution of an exploit may be very small, the
probability estimates will over-fit the given test-suite if the
test-suite only contains a few observations over uj . The same
phenomenon arises when computing sufficiency score, as most
instances with very few (or no) observations in the benign runs,
leading to an artificially high score. In other words, an arbitrary
test-suite is unlikely to distinguish between uj appearing in the
exploit trace for patch localization.
Need for Sufficient Observations of Yj = 1/0. The crux
of our problem is to construct a test-suite which distinguish
uj with only an exploit input. To explain it, we factorize the
necessity score into:
P (Yj = 1|C = 1) = P1 × P2 + P3 × P4
P1 = P (Yj = 1|C = 1, Yj−1 = 1)
P2 = P (Yj−1 = 1|C = 1)
P3 = P (Yj = 1|C = 1, Yj−1 = 0)
P4 = P (Yj−1 = 0|C = 1)
(1)
The terms P1 and P3 differentiate the correlation of uj to C
and of uj−1 to C. A high ratio of P1 to P3 means that uj and
uj−1 are equally correlated to C = 1, as the exploit inputs
always see the co-occurrence of uj and uj−1. However, a low
ratio means that uj is more likely to be observed when C =
1 than uj−1, hence distinguishing them. It is thus important
to construct a test-suite from which terms P1 and P3 can be
estimated robustly. In particular, we need a test-suite with a
sufficiently large number of exploit traces observing uj−1 and
not observing uj−1 respectively.
This motivates the need for what we call a concentrated
test-suite: a test-suite that has sufficiently many tests, both
observing and not observing each uj . The concentrated test-
suite would explore paths in the neighborhood of the exploit
trace. This is apparent in P1 in Equation 1: it is the probability
of observing uj , conditioned on the fact that we have observed
uj−1. This can be seen as following the trace of the given
exploiting input ie up to uj−1 but not necessarily following
the exploit trace after uj−1.
To generate a concentrated test-suite, we propose a new
form of directed fuzzing technique called concentrated fuzzing.
Concentrated fuzzing is constructed in a principled way, and
it carefully tries to avoid artificially biasing test cases towards
observing the events (i.e., Yj = 1 and C = 1) which we
will estimate from. This highlights the importance of having
various kinds of test cases including the exploits, the benign
cases, the cases reaching the crash location and the cases
deviating from the crash location. From a test-suite created
by concentrated fuzzing, we localize the patches and show the
corresponding empirical results (see Section VI).
Remark. Our work is the first to utilize directed fuzzing as
a solution for patch localization. While heavy-weight alterna-
tives such as those based on symbolic execution are possible
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Algorithm 1 Meta algorithm for concentrated fuzzing.
1: Input: Exploit input ie, Execution trace U , Instrumented
binary Prog
2: Result: Test-suite T
3: T ← ∅
4: for each uj ∈ U do
5: executeTillPrefix(ie, uj , Prog)
6: for k from 1 to α do
7: im = mutate(ie, uj);
8: tm = execute(im, Prog);
9: T ← T ∪ {tm}
10: end for
11: end for
solutions, these face challenges in scaling on binaries [17].
However, fuzzing is simpler to implement and scales. Other
forms of fuzzing (e.g., AFL [34] and Honggfuzz [1]) optimize
for different objectives from concentrated fuzzing. Their goal
is to cover more program paths, whereas our goal is to
explore only the neighborhood of a given exploit trace to find
likely patch location of the exploitable vulnerability. We also
compare our test-suite from concentrated fuzzing with directed
fuzzing tools like AFLGo [8] in our empirical evaluation.
III. CONCENTRATED FUZZING
Constructing a concentrated test-suite is not straight-
forward since the probability of reaching uj which is deep
inside the program is very low under most input distributions.
To achieve this goal, we propose a new solution called con-
centrated fuzzing (CONCFUZZ).
Algorithm 1 shows the high-level algorithmic sketch of
CONCFUZZ. It creates a set of inputs fully exploring each uj
(loop at Line 4) starting from u1. In each iteration, the basic
idea is to force the program execution to reach uj−1 (at Line
5), and then generate sufficiently many test cases that either
reach uj (stay on exploit path) or not (loop at Line 6). To
ensure the reachability of uj−1, many different strategies can
be used—for instance, we could pick a sample from the set
of test cases generated so far on which uj−1 was observed,
and replay the execution. For simplicity, we run the program
with the given exploit ie to execute a prefix of the exploit
trace upto uj−1. Then, we mutate ie to generate test cases,
some of which will observe uj . Notice that if these mutations
are made arbitrarily, the execution may diverge off the prefix
early, failing to observe uj−1. Section IV describes the details
of a directed fuzzing approach where certain input bytes in
ie remain unchanged, such that the prefix up to uj−1 will
be executed with high probability. Random mutations to other
bytes are created to create sufficient many samples over the
events Yj = 1 and Yj = 0.
An Illustrative Example. Figure 2 shows a hypothetical
vulnerable program which has a buffer overflow in write
function (at Line 3). Let us assume that the exploit input
available is ie=(10, 15, 2) where the three bytes of ie are inputs
to the program and are read from an input file “input.txt” at
Line 21. On execution of ie, the function write_array is
invoked with the arguments wsize=15 and msize=10. It is
easy to check that an additional check msize ≥ wsize on
the size of memory being allocated to the buffer writeArray
1void write(int size, char *writeArr){
2 for(int i=0; i<size; i++){
3 writeArr[i] = "A"; // <---- buffer overflow
4 }}
5
6int write_array(int wsize, int msize){
7 char *writeArray;
8 if (wsize > 20)
9 return -1;
10 else {...}
11 if (msize <= 10)
12 writeArray = (char *)malloc(msize);
13 else
14 writeArray = (char *)malloc(2*msize);
15 write(wsize, writeArray);// write wsize characters into
writeArray
16 ...}
17
18int main(int argc, char **argv){
19 int a, c, tag;
20 ...
21 FILE *fp = fopen("input.txt", "r+"); // Read inputs from
a file
22 fscanf(fp, "%d, %d, %d", &a, &c, &tag);
23 ...
24 if(tag == 1){ // Read from input file
25 read_array(c, fp);
26 ...
27 write_array(c, a);
28 } else if(tag == 2){ // Write array
29 write_array(c, a);
30 } else if(tag == 3){ // split the input file
31 ...
32 char array[10];
33 write(10, array);
34 }
35 ...
36 return 0;}
Fig. 2: Code snippet for illustrating our fuzzing and ranking.
There is a buffer overflow in function write.
at Line 11 is an ideal patch candidate. Notice that the patch is
not close to the point of the buffer overflow (Line 3), where the
variable msize is not even in scope. Ideal location to patch
can be far off from the exploit point, as in this example.
To localize at the right patch location, CONCFUZZ gener-
ates a concentrated test-suite to explore each on-exploit branch
instance uj . Recall that the goal of patch localization is to
identify the right location vi for fixing the vulnerability rather
than the instance uj . Thus, in Figure 3, we summarize the
number of test cases generated for each vi in the concentrated
test-suite. Notice that there are many test cases for both
observing and not observing each on-exploit location. These
tests are not generated with the objective of causing an exploit.
Biasing towards following vi, vi+1, · · · , vn would skew the
samples. Over-fitting to exploits and its effects are shown
experimentally in Section VI-C. This is an important difference
to recent works which explicitly aim to follow the path suffix
of the exploit after vi [17], [27]. Our tests seek to follow the
given exploit path prefix up to vi and then diverge.
Under the exploit ie, the vulnerable program executes the
branch at line 24 (v78), 28 (v79), 8 (v80), 11 (v81) and 2 (v82)
which are on-exploit locations. Taking v80 as an example,
CONCFUZZ forces the execution of the program to observe
branches {v1, · · · , v79} and gets 48 cases observing v80 and
89 cases that do not observe V80 (but instead observes v165).
Among these 48, 23 cases trigger the buffer overflow while the
remaining 25 cases do not. CONCFUZZ generates sufficient test
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Fig. 3: An example of concentrated test suite generated for the
the code snippet in Figure 2 and its corresponding necessity
(N) and sufficiency (S) score.
cases for each vi in this way and finally computes the necessity
and sufficiency score. As shown in Figure 3, v81 has the highest
scores compared with the other on-exploit locations, which is
the exact location of the ideal patch.
Careful readers may notice that our procedure executes ie
to force the prefix up to uj−1, when generating the concen-
trated test cases for uj . This corresponds to the conditional
probability P (Yj = 1|C = 1, Y1 = 1, · · · , Yj−1 = 1), as
opposed to P (Yj = 1|C = 1, Yj−1 = 1) desired in Section II.
Notice that the latter is a marginal probability which is a
summation over exponentially many conditional probabilities:∑
q1∈{0,1}
· · ·
∑
qj−2∈{0,1}
P (Yj = 1|T1 = q1, · · · , Tj−2 = qj−2, C = 1, Tj−1 = 1)
×P (T1 = q1, · · · , Tj−2 = qj−2|C = 1, Tj−1 = 1)
Since measuring the marginal would require sampling
across all paths leading up to uj , estimating it may require
intractably many test cases. However, as our experiments
demonstrate, the P (Yj = 1|C = 1, Y1 = 1, · · · , Yj−1 = 1)
serves as a good proxy for the marginal we desire. To
understand why such a proxy works well in practice, let us
consider the situation where there is conditional independence:
the probability of observing an event, conditioned on having
reached the point which observes uj−1, is independent of the
probability of reaching uj−1 in the first place. In such a case,
Fig. 4: PATCHLOC’s Architecture.
P (Yj = 1|C = 1, Y1 = 1, · · · , Yj−1 = 1)=P (Yj = 1|C =
1, Yj−1 = 1). In our example, the probability of reaching Line
11 is indeed almost independent of the probability of causing
exploits—for any given value of msize, there are many values
of wsize that would lead to exploits. Intuitively, when the
vulnerability is dependent on a small number of branches, such
“locality” creates conditional independence of the form that
our technique works well with.
IV. TECHNICAL DETAILS
The overall architecture of our tool called PATCHLOC is
shown in Figure 4. PATCHLOC includes two main components:
the concentrated fuzzer CONCFUZZ and the Ranker. CONC-
FUZZ takes in an instrumented vulnerable program and an
exploit input. It runs in a cycle until a pre-defined timeout
is reached or sufficient test cases for each uj have been
generated. Given the concentrated test-suite, the Ranker then
computes the sufficiency and necessity score and reports the
Top-K location with the highest combined score.
A. CONCFUZZ Internals
Concentrated fuzzing, the high-level design of which is
outlined in Algorithm 1, generates a concentrated test-suite
by executing the prefix of each uj . The key challenge is to
generate multiple inputs which follow the prefix of uj , since a
random mutation of the exploit input ie is unlikely to execute
a long prefix. To tackle this problem, the main observation we
make is that usually a small set of input bytes are responsible
for observing each uj . Thus, if we can fix the values of the
bytes influencing all of {u1, · · · , uj−1} to their corresponding
values in the exploit trace, then any mutation made on the
remaining bytes will result in a new test case that most likely
executes the prefix of uj .
Precisely, let each input i ∈ I contain q bytes of which each
is represented as bk (k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q}). CONCFUZZ keeps
track of the influence of different inputs bytes on each uj . If
we can observe that a change in the value of an input byte bk
results in a change on the state of uj , we say that bk influences
uj , or uj is sensitive to bk. The sensitivity relation is thus a
binary relation SM : (U, I)→ {0, 1}. SM(uj , bk) = 1 if we
have observed in concrete runs that uj is sensitive to input byte
bk, and 0 otherwise. The relation is stored explicitly in a data
structure called “sensitivity map”. Notice that the sensitivity
map captures both control and data dependencies between
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Algorithm 2 The implementation of concentrated fuzzing.
1: Input: Exploit input ie, Instrumented Binary Prog
2: Result: Test-suite T
3: Seed Pool SP ← {ie}; T ← ∅
4: repeat
5: is ←chooseSeed(SP )
6: ts ←execute(is, P rog)
7: Sensitivity Map SM ← initSM(is, ts)
8: Number of Mutated Bytes #B ← 0
9: repeat
10: #B ← #B + 1
11: repeat
12: Bytes B ←selectMutateBytes(SM, ts,#B)
13: if B is empty then
14: Break;
15: end if
16: for j from 1 to γ do
17: im ←mutate(is, B)
18: tm ←trace(im, prog)
19: T ← T + {tm}
20: if im is an exploit with a new trace then
21: SP ← SP + {im}
22: end if
23: SM ←updateSM(SM, ts, Ik, tm)
24: end for
25: until Timeout reaches or all the branch instances
have sufficient test cases
26: if #B ≥ β then
27: Break;
28: end if
29: until Timeout reaches or all the branch instances have
sufficient test cases
30: until Timeout reaches or all the seeds are checked
branches and the input. This notion of influence or sensitivity
is the same as that described in recent works [10], [12],
however, the way it is used in concentrated fuzzing is quite
different. Algorithm 2 explains how CONCFUZZ generates a
concentrated test-suite with the help of the sensitivity map.
Sensitivity Map Inference. The sensitivity map is constructed
directly from the observations during the execution of test
inputs. We mutate each byte bk of the input a constant number
of times (see γ at Line 16) and observe whether the state of
uj changes due to each mutation. If we cannot observe uj on
the trace after the mutation over an input byte bk in ie, we
infer that bk implicitly or explicitly influences the state of uj
i.e., SM(uj , bk) = 1 as well.
In more detail, for each round of fuzzing, CONCFUZZ first
compares the trace ts under a selected exploit input is with the
trace tm under each mutated input im. If tm diverges from ts at
uj , CONCFUZZ marks uj as being sensitive to the input byte in
ie mutated to create im in the sensitivity map. To exemplify,
let us revisit the running example from Figure 2. Given the
selected exploit input is = (10, 15, 2) and the mutated input
im = (10, 25, 2)—where the first byte b1 has value 10, the
second byte b2 is mutated and the third byte b3 has value 2—
CONCFUZZ infers that the branch at Line 11 is sensitive to b2
of the input. This is because branch at line 11 is not observed
when b2 > 20 in the trace of the exploit input is, and gets
1// arr holds the fuzzer input
2int buggy(char *arr){
3 b = arr[0];
4 c = arr[1];
5 d = arr[2];
6 e = arr[3];
7 g = arr[4];
8 ans = 0;
9 ...
10 if (b==1 && c==4){
11 ...
12 }
13 if (d==2 || e==3){
14 ...
15 if (g<5){
16 ...
17 //Bug here
18 }
19 }
20 ...
21 return ans;
22 }
Fig. 5: See that the and condition in Line 10 will require only
single byte mutations to infer that both arr[0] and arr[1] influ-
ence the condition. However, the condition in Line 13 requires
you to mutate both bytes arr[2] and arr[3] simulataneously to
infer that those bytes influence that condition.
observed in the trace of the mutated input im.
CONCFUZZ incrementally computes a sensitivity map over
each mutation for each uj . It starts with an empty sensitivity
map (at Line 7) where each uj is not influenced by any input
byte. Then, CONCFUZZ keeps updating it given a new test
case generated for each round of fuzzing (at Line 23) until the
timeout reaches or all the branch instances are fully explored.
Note that there could be scenarios where multiple bytes
of the input may be influencing the same branch and the
sensitivity map inferred by single byte mutations, as described
above, may not be useful for generating concentrated test-suite.
For instance, consider the code in Figure 5. The exploit input
constitutes of arr = [1, 4, 2, 3, 0] which satisfies the condition-
als in Lines 10, 13 and 15. The first conditional statement, in
Line 10, is a conjunction of conditionals on the values of two
input bytes arr[0] and arr[1]. Here, mutating one input byte at
a time is sufficient to infer that the branch is sensitive to both
the bytes. However, this is not the case for the disjunction
in Line 13. In this case, single byte mutation will lead to
a conclusion that bytes arr[2] and arr[3] do not influence
the branch as one of them is always True while the other is
being mutated. Therefore, while exploring the branch 15,our
sensitivity map will show that only arr[0], arr[1] as important
to execute the prefix till branch 13. Hence, PATCHLOC would
fix only the values of arr[0], arr[1] and mutate other bytes
including arr[2], arr[3], arr[4]. Consequently, the generated
concentrated test-suite will have very few traces that reach Line
15 attributing to a small random chance that the traces have
passed condition on the prefix branch (Line 13). Therefore, we
need to mutate both the corresponding bytes(arr[2], arr[3]) si-
multaneously to infer that the branch is sensitive to those bytes.
Evidently, sensitivity map inference is hard since the number
of combinations of such multiwise mutations is exponential in
the size of input. To tackle this, CONCFUZZ does multiwise
mutations iteratively (at Line 12 in Algorithm 2). Therefore,
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our technique does an approximate inference; mutating one
byte at a time in the first iteration and two bytes at a time
in the second until a user-configured number of iterations.
Further, we show that the inferred incomplete sensitivity map
is sufficient for patch localization for a majority of CVEs.
Concentrated Test-suite Generation. The sensitivity map
helps to generate sufficiently many samples for both events
Yj = 1 and Yj = 0, having observed uj−1. CONCFUZZ first
extracts all the input bytes from the sensitivity map to which
{u1, · · · , uj−1} are sensitive. It forces these input bytes to
take the same value as the selected exploit input is. Then,
to obtain enough samples for Yj = 1, CONCFUZZ mutates
the input bytes to which uj is non-sensitive in is as the
mutation over the non-sensitive bytes likely does not change
the state of uj . In contrast, for generating enough samples for
Yj = 0, CONCFUZZ mutates bytes to which uj is sensitive
and keeps the non-sensitive bytes as same as in is. For each
round of fuzzing, CONCFUZZ selects an instance uj which is
the earliest observed on the exploit trace but does not have
sufficient test cases. Then, it follows the above approach to
generate sufficiently many test cases with a limited number of
mutations (from Line 9 to 29).
For example, let us revisit the case of Line 11 in Figure 2.
Assume the sensitivity map knows that the branches at Line
28 and 8 are only sensitive to b3. To force the observation of
the branch at Line 28, CONCFUZZ ensures the value of b3 to
be 2 (which is as same as the exploit input). Then, it mutates
over b2 and keeps the remaining bytes as same as the exploit
input to get many samples that miss the branch at Line 11.
B. Location Ranking
Given the concentrated test-suite, the Ranker first removes
the duplicate traces from the test-suite to avoid biasing towards
any single trace. Then, it computes the necessity and suffi-
ciency scores of each on-exploit location vi. It first computes
these three values: 1) the number of test cases observing vi
and triggering the vulnerability (#(Xi = 1 ∧ C = 1)); 2) the
number of test cases triggering the vulnerability (#(C = 1));
and 3) the number of test cases observing vi (#(Xi = 1)).
Finally, it computes the necessity score N = #(Xi=1∧C=1)#(C=1)
and the sufficiency score S = #(Xi=1∧C=1)#(Xi=1) .
For concreteness, we revisit our running example from
Figure 2 and the concentrated test suite generated in Figure 3.
For v81, the sufficiency score P (C = 1|X81 = 1) = 2337
while the necessity score P (X81 = 1|C = 1) = 1. Then,
it normalizes both scores by min-max scaling and ranks
locations according to L2-norm of the normalized necessity
and sufficiency scores. The normalization function NM and
L2-norm score are defined as follows:
NM(N) =
N −min(N)
max(N)−min(N)
NM(S) =
S −min(S)
max(S)−min(S)
L2-norm score =
√
NM(N)2 +NM(S)2
where min(N)(min(S)) is the minimum of the necessity (suf-
ficiency) score across all branch locations (similarly max(N)
and max(S) are defined). We use L2-norm as the ranking
metric mainly because it treats the necessity and sufficiency
score equally important. Notice that L2-norm is just one of
many reasonable scoring metrics that could be used. As the
other metrics (e.g., Ochiai and Tarantula) use the same counts
as L2-norm for computing the scores [25], we expect them to
perform comparably on our concentrated dataset.
The Ranker reports the Top-K locations as localized can-
didates for patching. If there are multiple locations with the
same score, the ranker sorts them according to the proximity
to the crash point. The closer the location to the crash location,
the higher the rank.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement PATCHLOC on top of DynamoRIO [2].
We build a DynamoRIO client to dynamically monitor the
branches for each CVE. PATCHLOC is written in Python and
C++ with 1.4K LOC.
Dynamic Instrumentation. We build a DynamoRIO client to
monitor the state of each branch instance. The client searches
the specific opcodes (e.g., jle, jmp, je) which are related to
conditional statements and records the address of the condi-
tional statement in a file. We tried the dynamic instrumentation
on both instruction and branch level. The former could take a
few minutes to hours to terminate, while the latter takes less
than a second.
Input Mutation - Values. PATCHLOC allows users to define
their input mutation strategy. The default mutation strategy
is performed on byte level which includes both single-byte
mutation and pairwise mutation. Notice that the granularity of
mutation is controlled by users. Users can define the maximum
number of bytes to mutate jointly. Furthermore, PATCHLOC
allows the users to specify their strategies via a configuration
file if they have any prior knowledge about the input format.
Specifying the input format in the configuration file speeds up
CONCFUZZ by avoiding unnecessary mutations.
Input Mutation - Size. PATCHLOC does not support changing
the size of the original input currently. However, CONCFUZZ
changes numeric length values and NULL-termination charac-
ters as well, implicitly changing lengths of inputs. For example,
in LibTIFF, our approach will change the attribute of image
length in the input file, hence changing the size of inputs.
Vulnerability Oracle. PATCHLOC allows users to define their
own oracle for detecting whether an execution of a buggy
program triggers a vulnerability. In our evaluation, we utilize
the program crash or other detecting tools (e.g., Valgrind) as
our oracle for memory safety. For numerical errors and null
dereference, we dynamically instrument the binary with the
additional checks.
Binary to Source mapping. Our entire analysis is independent
of source code but we compare our Top-K patch locations
to the developer-provided patch for validating the correctness
of our results. Therefore, we implement a wrapper that maps
binary instructions to the corresponding source code statements
for the convenience. The wrapper is built on top of objdump
utility in Linux [3].
Optimization: Parallelization. PATCHLOC uses paralleliza-
tion to speed up certain tasks. In fuzzing phase, the relationship
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TABLE I: Vulnerable applications for evaluating PATCHLOC.
App. Description LOC
LibTIFF A library for reading and manipulating TIFFfiles. 66K
Binutils A collection of tools capable of creating themanaging binary programs. 2.7M
Libxml2 A library for parsing XML documents. 0.2M
Libjpeg A library for handling JPEG image format. 42K
Coreutils A collection of basic tools used on UNIX-likesystems. 63K
JasPer A collection of tools for coding andmanipulating images. 28K
FFmpeg A collection of libraries and programs forhandling video, audio and other files. 0.9M
ZZIPlib A library for extracting data from filesarchived in a single zip file. 8K
Potrace A tool for tracing bitmap images. 9K
Libming A library for manipulating MacromedianFlash files. 66K
Libarchive A library which manipulates streamingarchives in a variety of formats. 0.1M
inference is strictly sequential, however, the input mutation
and execution are independent. Thus, instead of updating the
sensitivity map for each test case, we dedicate each core to
the fuzzing procedure of each mutation target and collect the
test cases. Then, we utilize the collected test cases to update
the sensitivity map once for each round of fuzzing. In the
ranking phase, the sufficiency and necessity scores for multiple
locations can be computed simultaneously before the ordering
of L2-norm score.
Optimization: Caching. PATCHLOC stores the generated in-
puts and their corresponding traces for each round of fuzzing.
In the fuzzing phase, if CONCFUZZ checks all the values of
an input byte, it will avoid the mutation over the specific input
byte. This significantly increases the efficiency of CONCFUZZ
as each execution of the vulnerable program requires a certain
amount of time.
VI. EVALUATION
We aim to evaluate the following research questions:
• [RQ1] How effective is PATCHLOC on real-world
CVEs?
• [RQ2] Does CONCFUZZ help to prevent test-suite bias
and hence over-fitting?
We select a set of real-world CVEs and run PATCHLOC to
generate possible patch locations. We validate the efficacy of
PATCHLOC by comparing our results to developer patches
for the CVEs as the ground truth. We extract the developer-
generated patches from the bug reports or the commits pro-
vided by the developers.
A. Subjects and Setup
Our subjects are chosen to satisfy three requirements: 1)
The vulnerable applications can be executed; 2) a working
exploit is available; and 3) a valid developer patch is available.
Diversity of Subjects We select 43 CVEs that correspond to
11 applications, shown in Table I. Our dataset includes all 15
CVEs from the existing benchmarks used by recent work [14]
TABLE II: Efficacy of PATCHLOC for patch localization in
details [RQ1]. Column “#B” shows the number of branch
conditions in total. “#UB” indicates the unique on-exploit
locations. “At Crash Loc?” shows whether the developer-
generated patch is at the crash location or not. “Size(TS)”
means number of unique traces generated by PATCHLOC for
each CVE in 4 hours. “In Top-5?” describes whether there is
a correct patch location hitting one of the Top-5 candidates
outputted by PATCHLOC. “SM” means that the location of
the developer patch hits one of the Top-5 candidates. “EQ”
indicates the existence of an equivalent patch located at one
of the Top-5 candidates. The last column describes the rank
of PATCHLOC’s output which appears in / is equivalent to
developer patch (most have rank ≤ 5).
App. CVE ID BugType #B #UB
At
Crash
Loc?
Size(TS) InTop-5? Rank
LibTIFF
CVE-2016-3186 BO 0.3K 30 3 14 3(SM) 2
CVE-2016-5314 BO 0.1M 0.7K 7 0.4K 3(SM) 5
CVE-2016-5321 BO 6.6K 0.6K 3 4.3K 7 18
CVE-2016-9273 BO 8.2K 0.5K 7 1.7K 3(EQ) 1
CVE-2016-9532 BO 21.1K 0.7K 7 0.4K 3(EQ) 1
CVE-2016-10092 BO 15.4K 0.9K 7 5.4K 3(EQ) 3
CVE-2016-10094 BO 41.1K 1.0K 3 4.0K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2016-10272 BO 1.2M 0.9K 7 19 7 39
CVE-2017-5225 BO 12.8M 0.7K 7 3.1K 3(EQ) 1
CVE-2017-7595 DZ 13.1K 0.8K 7 2.7K 3(EQ) 1
CVE-2017-7599 DT 10.2K 0.8K 3 4.5K 3(EQ) 1
CVE-2017-7600 DT 10.3K 0.7K 3 30 3(SM) 1
CVE-2017-7601 IO 13.5K 0.9K 3 2.4K 3(SM) 4
Bugzilla-2611 DZ 0.1M 0.6K 7 1.4K 3(SM) 1
Bugzilla-2633 BO 6.1K 0.7K 7 5.8K 3(EQ) 1
Binutils
CVE-2017-6965 BO 2.3K 0.5K 3 0.4K 3(SM) 4
CVE-2017-14745 IO 9.5K 0.6K 3 1.5K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2017-15020 BO 16.0K 1.1K 3 1.4K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2017-15025 DZ 28.1K 1.0K 3 1.4K 3(SM) 1
Libxml2
CVE-2012-5134 BO 8.1K 1.5K 3 43.2K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2016-1838 BO 0.4M 1.0K 3 4.7K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2016-1839 BO 1.5M 1.4K 7 0.9K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2017-5969 ND 22.5K 1.4K 3 10.0K 7 24
Libjpeg
CVE-2012-2806 BO 1.5K 0.2K 3 46 3(SM) 1
CVE-2017-15232 ND 0.1M 0.6K 3 8.0K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2018-14498 BO 1.2K 0.1K 3 0.1K 3(SM) 1
CVE-2018-19664 BO 21.3M 0.1K 7 5 3(EQ) 3
Coreutils
GNUbug-19784 BO 0.2K 34 3 0.5K 3(SM) 1
GNUbug-25003 IO 0.1K 0.1K 3 7 3(SM) 1
GNUbug-25023 BO 1.3K 0.3K 7 0.1K 7 > 200
GNUbug-26545 IO 0.5K 0.2K 7 1.9K 3(SM) 2
JasPer
CVE-2016-8691 DZ 38.9K 0.3K 7 0.1K 3(EQ) 1
CVE-2016-9557 IO 44.0K 0.5K 3 2.7K 3(SM) 4
FFmpeg CVE-2017-9992 BO 11.7K 0.6K 3 0.6K 3(EQ) 1Bugchrom-1404 IO 7.6M 0.9K 7 0.4K 7 187
ZZIPlib
CVE-2017-5974 BO 0.1K 0.1K 7 0.2K 3(SM) 2
CVE-2017-5975 BO 0.1K 0.1K 7 0.2K 3(EQ) 2
CVE-2017-5976 BO 0.1K 0.1K 3 0.3K 3(SM) 1
Potrace CVE-2013-7437 BO 0.3M 0.1K 7 2 3(EQ) 1
Libming
CVE-2016-9264 BO 38 26 7 29 3(EQ) 4
CVE-2018-8806 UF 1.1K 0.1K 3 2.3K 3(EQ) 2
CVE-2018-8964 UF 1.1K 0.1K 3 4.6K 3(EQ) 5
Libarchive CVE-2016-5844 IO 6.1K 0.7K 3 46 3(SM) 1
that satisfy the above three criteria1. We added 28 more
CVEs to increase the diversity of the benchmarks, as SENX
benchmarks have only 2 kinds of security vulnerabilities. Our
final benchmarks have 6 categories of vulnerability including
26 buffer overflow (BO), 4 divide-by-zero (DZ), 7 integer
overflow (IO), 2 null pointer dereferences (ND), 2 heap use-
after-free (UF) and 2 data-type overflows (DT).
Statistics of Subjects. The subjects have sizes ranging from
10 thousand to 2 million LOC. Most of them have very few
(less than 30) or no manually written tests for the vulnerable
program and its configuration. The exploit input sizes vary
from 1B to 74KB with an average of 8KB. Table II shows
that the exploit traces have a few tens to millions of observed
1SENX has 42 benchmark programs. We eliminated the following: 18
programs that do not have any developer patches (missing ground truth to
evaluate against); 2 that do not have reproducible exploits, 2 that are on x86
CPUs while our present implementation supports only x64; 5 that do not work
on vanilla DynamoRio without instrumentation (either crashing DynamoRio
or taking hours and utilizing excessive memory for a single trace).
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Fig. 6: Efficacy of PATCHLOC for patch localization [RQ1].
on-exploit branch instances. Recall that PATCHLOC works
by recording only branch conditionals, i.e., one per basic
block. On average, there are 0.3 million on-exploit branch
instances, with minimum of 38 and maximum of 7.6 million.
Due to loops and recursion, many observed locations repeat—
we also report the unique number of locations considered by
PATCHLOC for computing scores in Table II.
Experiment Setup. All our experiments are performed on a
56-core 2.0GHz 64GB RAM Intel Xeon machine. Each round
of fuzzing phase allows to mutate maximally 2 bytes at a time
(β=2 in Algorithm 2) and mutates γ times over each mutation
target. We set γ=200 (see Algorithm 2) for the default mutation
strategy. We set a timeout of 4 hours per benchmark to generate
a test-suite and allow the fuzzing phase to fork 10 processes
maximally.
Correctness criteria. We say that PATCHLOC is able to
pinpoint the fix location, if:
• the Top-5 locations outputted by PATCHLOC includes
(at least one) location of the developer patch; or
• one of the Top-5 locations from PATCHLOC can be
modified to produce a patch semantically equivalent
to developer patch.
The semantically equivalent patch is generated based on the
distance of predicted location to the developer provided patch
location and available live variables. If the predicted location is
in the same function as the developer patch and all the variables
used in the developer patch are live, a simple displacement of
developer’s patch usually suffices. If that is not possible then
we use domain specific knowledge to create a patch using
the developer patch variables or the live variables that taint
them. In order to validate our patches we run the patched
application on the generated test-suite as well as the developer
provided test suite if available. An example of equivalent
patch is described in Section VII. For more instances, we
also provide all the equivalent patches in the supplementary
material. Our criterion of choosing Top-5 recommendations
follows from empirical studies on practitioners’ expectations
from automated fault localization tools [20]. We also report on
the exact rank of the correct patch in Table II.
B. [RQ1] Efficacy for Patch Localization
Main Results. Figure 6 summarizes the efficacy of PATCHLOC
for patch localization and the distribution of the type of
the generated patch location. Out of 43 CVEs, PATCHLOC
successfully locates the patch for 38 CVEs within the Top-5
candidates, Among these 38 CVEs, the patch location for 25
CVEs hits the topmost candidate (see Figure 6). Recall that
there may exist multiple patch locations which are equivalent
for fixing the vulnerability. We observe that, for 23 out of
38 successful CVEs, one of the top-5 candidate locations
corresponds exactly to a location patched in the developer
patch. For 15 out of 38 CVEs, we can create an equivalent
patch. To further investigate these results, Table II presents the
detailed result of patch localization for each CVE. PATCHLOC
successfully generates sufficient test-suite for each CVE. Un-
like the manually written test-suite where no test triggers
the bug, PATCHLOC generates 2.7K test cases on average,
around 40% of which trigger the vulnerability for half of
the benchmarks. In addition, PATCHLOC performs well on all
categories of security bugs: it successfully locates the patch in
Top-5 candidates for 23 buffer overflows, 6 integer overflows,
all 4 divide-by-zero, 1 null dereference, 2 heap use-after-free
and 2 data-type overflows. In addition, PATCHLOC performs
equally on different applications. For example, it successfully
locates the patch for 13 out of 15 CVEs in LibTiff, all 4
CVEs in Binutils, and 3 out of 4 CVEs in Libxml2. This
indicates that the success of PATCHLOC is not correlated with
the size and the type of the application.
Performance. The total time taken for patch localization on
each CVE has two components: fuzzing time and analysis
time. We set the fuzzing time to 4 hours for all the CVEs.
The analysis time varies with each CVE and the number of
candidates to report (e.g., Top-100). The maximum analysis
time taken by PATCHLOC is within 10 minutes with Top-200
candidates to report.
Distance to Crash Locations. One way of localizing patches
is to place them right before the crash point [14]. In around
44% of the CVEs we study, the developer-generated patches
do not coincide with the crash location. Our patches created
from the PATCHLOC are on a location different from the crash
location for 10 out of 38 CVEs. An example of such a patch
generated by PATCHLOC, which is far from the crash location,
is CVE-2016-5314, as shown in Section II.
Need for Probabilistic Approaches. In many CVEs (33 out
of 43) the patch locations do not have both necessity and
sufficiency scores equal to 1, even for developer patches. Such
patch locations do not cleanly separate all exploiting test cases
from benign ones. The lack of any program points, at which
a clean separation between passing and failing test is possi-
ble, highlights the inherent uncertainty in choosing between
patch candidates. This motivates the need for probabilistic
approaches such as ours.
C. [RQ2] Tackling Over-fitting
We examine the impact of the test-suite bias on patch
localization. Poor test-suites make it difficult to distinguish
between different program locations as patch points. This is
exhibited by many locations obtaining the same score from
localization. On the other hand, a concentrated test-suites seg-
regates locations better. We can therefore measure how much
a test-suite contributes towards segregating patch locations in
statistical localization.
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Fig. 7: Effects of test-suite bias [RQ2].
We evaluate patch localization using three different kinds
of test-suites:
• T1: a biased test-suite which only contains exploits,
• T2: a biased test-suite which only contains tests reach-
ing the crash location, and
• T3: a concentrated test-suite produced by PATCHLOC.
We measure the efficacy of PATCHLOC under these three test-
suites by counting the number of branch locations which have
the same score. We call a set of locations with the same score
as a cluster. Notice that if the test-suite is effective in patch
localization, the number of clusters will be very large. To
measure the distinguishability of a given test-suite, we set T3
as the baseline and compute the ratio of the number of clusters
generated by using T1 or T2 vs. the number of clusters using
T3, which is called as distinguishability ratio.
Figure 7 summarizes the distinguishability ratio of the
biased test-suites T1 and T2 on patch localization for 43 real
CVEs. For 36 out of 43 CVEs (84%), the number of clusters
generated by T1 is 50% fewer than the one generated by the
concentrated test-suite T3. Similar results (50% fewer clusters
for 36 CVEs) are also shown by the biased test-suite T2.
This clearly demonstrates that a concentrated test-suite (T3)
improves significantly over other test-suites.
Existing tools like AFLGo [8] and F3 [17] can be used
to generate the test-suites for our purpose. However, they
are not designed to produce concentrated test-suites, which
is the key conceptual advance in our proposed technique
(see Section II-C). We experimentally show both F3 and
AFLGo generate test-suites which are biased towards the crash
location, thus, their test-suites belong to the category T2.
Furthermore these tools rely on external source-based analysis
engines such as dynamic symbolic analysis (for F3) and intra-
procedural control flow graph construction (for AFLGo).
Comparison with AFLGo. We compared our work quanti-
tatively with the directed fuzzer AFLGo [8]. We collect all
the inputs generated by AFLGo as our test-suite, with the
crash location as the target. These inputs include the both cases
which reach and deviate from the crash location. Although this
test-suite is balanced to some extent (and hence helps AFLGo),
AFLGo can only successfully locate the patch location in Top-
5 for 18 out of 43 CVEs; this is also somewhat because
of the complexity of partial control flow graph construction
in AFLGo. In comparison, our approach indicated the patch
location among Top-5 candidates in 38 out of 43 CVEs in
total. These results show that while our concentrated fuzzing
1 int readextension(void){
2 ...
3 char buf[255];
4 ...
5 - while ((count = getc(infile)) && count <= 255)
6 + while ((count = getc(infile)) && count >= 0 && count
<= 255)
7 if (fread(buf, 1, count, infile) != (size_t) count)
{...}
8 }
Fig. 8: PATCHLOC highlights the same location where the
developer-generated patch is applied for CVE-2016-3186.
is a form of directed fuzzing, directed fuzzing tools cannot be
straightforwardly used for our problem.
Comparison with F3. We also compare with the fault localiza-
tion tool F3 [17]. We keep the same ranking algorithm used in
PATCHLOC and only change the test-suite for a fair comparison
over the quality of the test-suite. The implementation of F3
uses an out-of-date LLVM version, 2.9. Due to insufficient
support of external functions and the inline assembly functions,
F3 fails to generate test-suite for 19 CVEs. We do not know
how F3 would have performed in localization accuracy for
these 19 CVEs if the tool implementation was able to handle
them. For the remaining 43−19 = 24 CVEs, the size of the
test-suite generated by F3 is around 4 times smaller than the
test-suite generated by PATCHLOC. In our experiments, F3
always recommends patch locations at or next to the crash
locations. The reason is overfitting: The test-suite obtained
from F3 has a high density of tests that reach the crash point.
If a given CVE (e.g., CVE-2016-9264 in Section VII) cannot
be patched before the crash location, F3 fails to pinpoint the
correct patch location within Top-5 candidates. Among the 24
CVEs that F3 handles, it generates patch location in Top-5
for 19 out of them. In contrast, PATCHLOC generates patch
location among Top-5 for all the CVEs where F3 works and
3 more (total 22).
VII. CASE STUDIES
In order to understand the quality of patch localization,
we present two examples: a) CVE-2016-3186 for which the
developer patch coincides with one of the Top-5 candidates
and b) CVE-2016-8691 for which the developer patch does
not coincide with any of the Top-5 candidates but there is
an equivalent manually generated patch at one of the Top-5
candidates.
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1 ...
2 samplerate_idx = (flags & MP3_SAMPLERATE) >>
MP3_SAMPLERATE_SHIFT;
3 + if (samplerate_idx < 0 || samplerate_idx >
MP3_SAMPLERATE_IDX_MAX){
4 + error("invalid samplerate index");}
5 ... // <-- code with no relation to samplerate_idx
6 samplerate = mp1_samplerate_table[samplerate_idx];
Fig. 9: Developer-generated patch for CVE-2016-9264.
1 ...
2 samplerate_idx = (flags & MP3_SAMPLERATE) >>
MP3_SAMPLERATE_SHIFT;
3 ... // <-- code with no relation to samplerate_idx
4 + if (samplerate_idx < 0 || samplerate_idx >
MP3_SAMPLERATE_IDX_MAX){
5 + error("invalid samplerate index");}
6 samplerate = mp1_samplerate_table[samplerate_idx];
Fig. 10: Semantically equivalent manually generated patch at
the location highlighted by PATCHLOC for CVE-2016-9264.
Finding developer-generated patch location (CVE-2016-
3186) This is a buffer overflow in LibTIFF which causes a
denial of service via a crafted GIF image. Consider Figure 8,
the overflow happens in function readextension when it
reads a GIF extension block at Line 7. When getc detects
the end of file, it returns EOF which is negative number.
However, the loop condition only checks if count ≤ 255. If
count is negative, the loop condition is satisfied and count
is casted to size_t, which leads to the buffer overflow.
PATCHLOC analyzes this CVE and outputs the branch con-
dition in Line 5 as one among the Top-5 candidates. This
coincides exactly with the developer patch which adds an
additional check at Line 5 to prevent overflow.
Finding equivalent patch location (CVE-2016-9264) This
is an example of an out-of-bounds read in Libming library
which can crash any web application that uses this library to
process untrusted mp3 files. Consider Figure 9, the variable
samplerate_idx in Line 2, is read from an input mp3 file
and is used to set the samplerate in Line 6. Executing
the exploit mp3 file results in an out-of-bounds access at
Line 6 which sets samplerate to 0 and later results in a
crash due to floating-point exception. So, the developer patch
is applied at Line 3 just after reading samplerate_idx
from input. However, PATCHLOC suggests to add a check just
before the out-of-bounds access at Line 6, shown in Figure 10.
The original code between Line 2 and Line 6 does not use
samplerate_idx and it is not affected by the input file.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Ruling out spurious correlation. Correlation does not imply
causation, and given the statistical nature of PATCHLOC, it is
natural to ask whether the results observed are an artifact of
pure chance or spurious correlations. We additionally investi-
gated why PATCHLOC works in the cases where it reports the
right candidate in the Top-5.
First, we observed that the correct developer-provided
patch is small, typically spanning a single branch location
or at most 3 branch locations for more than 90% of our
benchmarks. Given that each benchmark executes thousands of
basic blocks in one exploit, the odds of pinpointing the correct
branch location in the Top-5 by random chance is extremely
low. PATCHLOC is doing significantly better than randomly
guessing locations.
Second, we manually investigated why PATCHLOC assigns
the highest score to the correct patch location whenever it
does. To carry out this investigation, we extended PATCHLOC
to compute the sensitivity map for the variables around that
location. Upon testing with the concentrated test-suite, we
found that certain variables have the highest L2 scores—they
are most sensitive to transformation of a benign input into an
exploiting one. We find these highest sensitivity variables often
correspond to the variables that are sanitized or bounded in the
developer-provided patch. For example, the variable count has
been correctly identified as the highest sensitivity variable for
CVE-2016-3186. Our manual investigation confirms that a
simple extension to PATCHLOC is able to identify a handful
of candidate variables that should be patched, beyond just
identifying the correct location. This shows that the results
that PATCHLOC is explainable and not an artifact of spurious
correlation. We leave utilizing this observation for a full patch
synthesis to future work.
Quality of Patch Locations. During our manual analysis over
patch locations, two of the authors independently analyzed
the location of developer-generated patch versus the location
recommended by PATCHLOC. In particular, for the equivalent
patch location, as the developer patch is available, generating
a semantically equivalent patch and inspecting it manually
turned out to be relatively straightforward in our experiments,
requiring less than an hour of work per CVE per person.
Sensitivity map recovery. The recovery of the sensitivity map
may be of independent interest to other binary analyses and
fuzzers. PATCHLOC uses a simplistic strategy to recover the
sensitivity map in its CONCFUZZ module. It uses single byte
mutations as well as pairwise mutations. We observed that
using pairwise mutations improves the recovered sensitivity
map over using single byte mutations in our experiments, at
the expense of increasing the number the number of tests
quadratically. We believe that more advanced strategies could
be employed, for example, based on group mutations combined
with binary search. This can further improve the scalability of
PATCHLOC or other tools that use sensitivity maps.
Evaluation Subjects. To mitigate risks of selection bias,
we chose application subjects / CVEs from a recent study
on security bug repair [14]. To show the generalization of
PATCHLOC over various bug types, we add 24 more CVEs
into our evaluation subjects with four bug types in total.
However, different benchmarks may lead to different results—
this remains a threat to validity for our work.
Multi-line Patches. PatchLoc currently does not support mul-
tiple locations for patching. We speculate that multi-location
patches may be feasible in future work by calculating necessity
/ sufficiency scores for multiple locations i.e., considering the
joint distribution across multiple locations at a time.
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IX. RELATED WORK
One of the earliest efforts in fault localization is via
dynamic slicing [5]. It takes in a program input and a slicing
criterion in the form of 〈l, v〉 where l is a location and v is
a variable. It uses data and control dependencies to explain
the value of v in l in the execution trace of the given input.
Since dynamic slicing involves high computational overheads
and dynamic slices are still large, more accurate methods
to localize observable errors in programs have been studied.
One of the notable works in this regard, is the principle of
delta debugging [35] which localizes observable errors by
computing the differential of a failing artifact, and a “similar”
benign artifact. The artifact could be in the form of test inputs,
or execution traces. One of the major difficulties in employing
this line of work is that its accuracy crucially depends on the
choice of the benign artifact.
Progress in localization via trace comparison has led to
other works involving more systematic generation of the
benign trace, and a natural extension to probabilistic reasoning.
These include the use of a systematic off-line search to gener-
ate the passing trace via branch direction mutation [31], as well
as online predicate switching by forcibly switching a branch
predicate’s outcome at run-time [36]. Our work draws some
inspiration from the theme of predicate switching, however,
it is effected in a completely different fashion. Instead of
forcibly changing a branch predicate at run-time, we conduct
repeated runs of directed fuzzing with the goal of flipping
branch predicate(s).
Our work follows the statistical fault localization frame-
work [33], where a score is assigned to each statement of
the program based on its occurrence in passing and failing
execution traces. One of the first works in this regard is
Tarantula [18], which has subsequently been followed by many
works proposing many scoring metrics, including the Ochiai
metric [4]. The main hypothesis in these works is that the
control flow of the execution traces of tests can be used
to determine likely causes of failure of a test. Thus, if a
statement occurs frequently in failing test executions and rather
infrequently in passing test executions, it is likely to be scored
highly and brought to the attention of the developer. It is well-
known that the accuracy of these methods is highly sensitive
to the choice of tests [24], [30]. Most works in this regime use
externally provided or arbitrarily chosen test suites.
Very few works have attempted to address the central
challenge of choosing the right test suite. Works related to ours
include F3 [17] which builds on the techniques proposed in
BugRedux [16]. The goal of BugRedux is different from ours,
it is to re-produce a field failure trace by following through
”breadcrumbs” given as locations visited. F3 [17] relaxes the
execution synthesis component of BugRedux by generating
many tests via symbolic execution. Hence F3 is closer to our
work than BugRedux and we can compare our concentrated
fuzzing with test generation in F3. Our quantitative comparison
with F3 has been reported in this paper. Other works like
MIMIC [37] extend F3 with a model of correct behavior
developed from dynamic specification mining in the form
of potential invariants from passing traces. Such works are
geared towards explaining failure causes for better debugging,
whereas we identify locations for inserting patches.
An independent and concurrent work called AURORA also
proposes patch localization under similar assumptions, how-
ever, it uses an off-the-shelf fuzzing strategy, namely AFL’s
crash exploration mode, to create a test-suite for statistical
fault localization [7]. AURORA proposes mechanisms for
synthesizing and ranking a particular kind of predicates during
its statistical analysis. In contrast, PATCHLOC offers a new
systematic test-suite generation technique, while retaining the
rest of the structure of statistical fault localization. We believe
that our work is complementary as one could combine our
concentrated test-suite generation with the predicate synthesis
and ranking mechanism proposed in AURORA.
Even though PATCHLOC does not synthesize patches, the
task of patch localization via concentrated fuzzing can be seen
as a mechanism to alleviate over-fitting in program repair.
Compared to existing works which heuristically rank candidate
patches to reduce over-fitting [15], [32], PATCHLOC supports
systematic test generation to witness the possible deviations
from a given exploit trace.
A different line of work employs symbolic analysis meth-
ods for localizing the root cause of an observable error [26],
[19], [9], [11]. The central observation in these works is
that localization can benefit from specification inference. Even
in the absence of formal specifications of intended program
behavior, these works seek to infer properties of intended
program behavior by symbolically analyzing various program
artifacts such as failing execution traces, past program versions
as so on. These approaches proceed via source code analysis,
and incur the overheads of symbolic execution.
Our specific proposal for concentrated fuzzing is most
closely related to GREYONE, a recent work of taint-based
fuzzing for bug-finding [12] which extends notions of taint
or influence from recent work [10]. Concentrated fuzzing has
orthogonal objectives to this work, as it does not aim to
maximize coverage or number of exploits.
SENX is an automatic patch synthesis tool for certain
vulnerabilities based on information from source code and an
exploit [14]. SENX uses a simplistic strategy for localization:
it uses the statement before the crash as the patch point. Such
localization is typically only sufficient for if-guard fixes at the
crash location, which may not fix the fault in a general way,
but workaround to prevent an error from being observable. In
our experiments, we have reported 10 (out of 34) legitimate
patch locations which are different from the crash location. We
show an example in Section VII.
Other works that aim to localize by identifying
workarounds that make errors unobservable have also been
proposed, such as Talos [13]. Talos extensively uses source
code and specializes for specific software coding practices or
idioms. A number of prior works use source code for patch
localization, including a recent work that employs deep learn-
ing over code features [22]. Our work minimizes assumptions
about the availability of such features and yet achieves high
accuracy in real-world programs.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel directed fuzzing approach
to generate a concentrated test-suite for ranking potential patch
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locations for an exploitable vulnerability witnessed by a given
exploit trace. We have shown that PATCHLOC achieves high
accuracy in identifying the right patch location for real-world
CVEs. From the point of view of localization, our proposed
approach can be seen as a fine-grained localization method—
given an exploit trace (essentially a trace of a failing input),
we seek to systematically generate tests whose execution sum-
maries can provide an explanation of the failure by suggesting
candidate patch locations.
In conclusion, we highlight four important aspects of our
technique. First it does not depend on manually constructed
tests, and systematically generates deviations from an exploit
via a form of controlled fuzzing. Second, and related to the
first point, we achieve the systematic test-suite construction
without incurring the overheads of symbolic approaches such
as symbolic execution. Third, our approach works on both
source code and binaries. So, it can work on applications where
part of the source code (say of a library) is unavailable. It
can also help create a find-and-fix cycle where we seek to fix
the vulnerabilities found through fuzz testing. Last but not the
least, given the fix location(s) produced by PATCHLOC, the ob-
served values at the fix location(s) on the test inputs generated
by concentrated fuzzing, can be directly used as specifications
to drive program synthesis engine. Such automatic fix synthesis
remains an attractive direction of future work.
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